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ARTICLES
SEC Enforcement of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act*
WALLACE L. TIMMENY**
INTRODUCTION

President Carter signed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) on December 19, 1977.' The general purpose of the Act is
to prevent the bribing of foreign government officials by companies
or individuals subject to the laws of the United States and to require
certain companies to comply with books and records and internal
accounting control provisions. As will be seen, enforcement of the
Act falls on the shoulders of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) and the Department of Justice. With minor exceptions,2 both the Commission and the Department have eschewed
comment on enforcement questions that may arise under the Act.
The hesitation to promulgate guidelines reportedly stems from a
fear that guidelines would provide road maps for would-be violators.' It has, however, been suggested that such guidelines may serve
the legitimate purpose of clarifying matters for businessmen who are
* The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private speech or publication by any of its members or employees. The views
expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission
or of its staff.
This article has been adapted from remarks delivered by Wallace Timmeny at an American Bar Association National Institute on Worldwide Legal Challenges to U.S. Transnational
Business, New York City, December 15, 1978, and at the Eighth Securities Law Institute of
the Bar Association of Greater Cleveland, March 8, 1979.
** LL.B. 1964, New York University. Deputy Director, Division of Enforcement,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C. and Co-chairman of the District
of Columbia Bar Association Subcommittee on Securities Law Investigation and Litigation.
1. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2), 78dd-1 to 78dd-2
(Supp. I 1977).
Some helpful articles on interpretive and enforcement questions under the FCPA are:
Atkinson, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of 1977: An InternationalApplication of SEC's
Corporate Governance Reforms, 12 INT'L LAw. 703 (1978); Baruch, The Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, 57 HAZv. Bus. Rxv. 32 (1979); Best, The Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 11 REv.
SEc. REG. 975 (1978).
2. The few official comments contained in SEC releases are discussed in the text accompanying notes 10 and 27 infra.
3. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 19, 1979, at 63.
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now reluctant to seek foreign business because of the uncertainties
created by the Act.4 Be that as it may, it is not the purpose of this
paper to provide guidance on the government's prosecutorial priorities; it is, rather, to discuss legal issues arising from the enforcement
of the Act in actions brought by the Commission.
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES

Acr

AND ITS ADMINISTRATION

Section 103 of the FCPA amends section 30 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) by adding section 30A, which
prohibits issuers that register securities or file reports under the
Exchange Act and persons acting on their behalf from bribing foreign government officials to obtain or retain business or direct business to any person.' Section 104 of the FCPA extends the same prohibitions to certain individuals and to corporations, partnerships,
and other business associations that are organized in the United
States or have their principal place of business in the United States
and that do not register securities or file reports under the Exchange
Act.' Section 102 of the FCPA adds section 13(b)(2) to the Exchange
Act' which subjects to recordkeeping and accounting controls requirements issuers that register securities or file reports under the
Exchange Act.
On February 15, 1979, the Commission announced the adoption
of two rules promulgated under the FCPA. Rule 13b2-11 prohibits
the falsification of books and records required to be kept under
section 13(b)(2)(A). Rule 13b2-2' prohibits any officer or director
from making materially false or misleading statements or omitting
to state any material facts to accountants or auditors in connection
with audits or the preparation of filings required by the Exchange
Act.10
The FCPA provides for dual administration of its provisions by
the Commission and the Department of Justice. To enforce the
4. The Carter administration, through the Department of Commerce, has urged the
Department of Justice to provide guidelines for the purpose of fighting inflation. This is
apparently to encourage exports by American companies, although it is unclear to what
extent, if any, guidelines would help fight inflation. Thus, we might expect the Department
of Justice to break silence soon. See Justice Is Reluctant, Guide on New Bribe Legislation,
Washington Post, Oct. 10, 1978, § D, at 7-9.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (Supp. 1 1977).
6. Id. § 78dd-2.
7. Id. § 78m(b)(2). It is important to note that the reach of section 13(b)(2) is not limited
to foreign activities.
8. 44 Fed. Reg. 10,970 (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-).
9. Id. (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2).
10. 16 SEC Docket 1143, [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 81,959 (1979).
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FCPA and related rules, the Commission may make use of its enforcement powers under section 15 of the Exchange Act (administrative proceedings), section 21 of the Exchange Act (investigative
and injunctive authority) and rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules
of Practice." In addition, the Commission may transmit evidence
of possible violations to the Attorney General for criminal proceedings." Section 104 of the FCPA empowers the Department of Justice
to institute civil injunctive actions. But the FCPA does not provide
the Department with civil investigative tools such as subpoena
power. Thus, unless the Congress amends the FCPA to provide the
Department of Justice with investigative powers comparable to the
Commission's powers under section 21, the Department will be
handicapped in its efforts to use the injunctive authority provided
in section 104.
INJUNCTIVE AcTIONS TO ENFORCE SECTION

30A

If past performance is any guide, the Commission can be expected to bring most of its enforcement actions with respect to section 30A as injunctive actions under section 21(d) of the Exchange
Act. 3 The Commission is empowered to seek an injunction against
future violations whenever it shall appear that any person is violating or is about to violate the Exchange Act or rules thereunder, and
upon a proper showing a district court may grant a restraining order
or a temporary or permanent injunction." In practice, the granting
of a permanent injunction hinges on the findings of a violation and
the likelihood of a future violation.' 5
The showing to establish a likelihood of a future violation will,
of course, vary from case to case, but the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals has .- n recent decisions carefully outlined the standards
that should b .nsidered by district courts in determining whether
to grant injunctive relief. In SEC v. Universal Major Industries,
11., 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1978).
12. Exchange Act § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976).
13. The injunctive action is the most frequently used enforcement tool. In fiscal 1977 the
Commission filed 166 injunctive actions. 1977 SEC ANN. REP. 325.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d). Two commentators have deplored the inattention of the Commission to the language "is" violating or "is about to" violate in section 21(d). Klein, Response
On SEC Consents... Processis CorruptingAll, Legal Times of Washington, June 26, 1978,
at 20, col. 1; Mathews, The SEC and Civil Injunctions: It's Time to Give the Commission an
Administrative Cease and Desist Remedy, 6 Sac. RzG. L.J. (1979).
15. See generally SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978);
SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Manor Nursing
Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
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Inc., 6 and in SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Securities,Inc., 7 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals suggests that before imposing a
permanent injunction district courts consider the following factors:
(1) whether the defendant's violation was an isolated incident or
part of a pattern of recurring violations;
(2) whether the violation was gross or egregious as opposed to
technical;
(3) the degree of scienter involved in the violation;
(4) the steps taken by the defendant to remedy the violation;
(5) the defendant's attitude at trial concerning the alleged violations; and
(6) whether the defendant currently occupies or may occupy a
position that will expose the defendant to future opportunities to
violate the federal securities laws.
Substantial focus is likely on these issues in injunctive actions
to enforce the FCPA, since the strict proscriptions of that Act, particularly the books and records provisions of section 13(b), may
leave defendants little room to argue against the finding of a violation.
Standard of Proof
As noted, the first hurdle for the Commission in an injunctive
action is proof to sustain a finding of a violation. In Collins Securities Corp. v. SEC," the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that in an administrative proceeding involving proof of
fraud by inference and a bar from the securities business, the standard of proof required was a clear and convincing standard as opposed to a preponderance of the evidence standard. The defendants
in SEC v. Savoy Industries" and SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical
Securities, Inc. ,20 argued unsuccessfully that the clear and convincing standard should apply in injunctive actions. But the Savoy and
the Commonwealth cases may not be the last word on this issue.
The substantial collateral effects of an injunction that are identical
or similar to the sanction involved in Collins, such as possible disqualification from association with a broker-dealer2 or automatic
16. 546 F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nor., Homans v. SEC, 434 U.S.
834 (1977).
17. 574 F.2d at 100.
18. 562 F.2d 820 (D.D.C. 1977).
19. [1978J FED. Sac. L. RmP. (CCH) 96,497 (D.D.C. 1978).
20. 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978).
21. Exchange Act § 15(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c)(4) (1976).
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disqualification from association with a registered investment
company,2 may cause the standard of proof question to come up
again in SEC injunctive actions.n
Mental State of the Alleged Violator
Questions concerning standard of proof notwithstanding, the
principal questions in any injunctive action usually involve the elements of the section allegedly violated. The most likely issue to be
contested in actions to enjoin violations of section 30A will be the
mental state of the alleged violator.2 ' Section 30A prohibits payments or promises of payment made corruptly to any foreign official,2 and the legislative history of the section indicates that the
word "corruptly" connotes an evil motive or purpose. 2 The Commission, however, announcing the passage of the FCPA, pronounced
that "a negligence standard will govern civil injunctive actions
brought to enforce the Act."' ' Whether the Commission's running
start on the issue proves to be effective remains to be seen. The
Commission would justify the lower negligence standard by arguing
that the Commission brings injunctive actions to protect the public
from the harm that ensues from a violation of the securities laws.
Thus, a court may properly focus on that harm and issue an injunction to protect the public based solely on the negligent conduct of a
22. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 9(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(a)(2) (1976).
23. At the time Savoy and Commonwealth were decided, however, injunctive actions did
not necessarily have a collateral estoppel effect on later actions for damages. See, e.g.,
Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970). Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Parklane
99 S. Ct. 645 (1979), held that a defendant may not
U.S. _
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, relitigate in a damage action issues of fact resolved in a prior SEC enforcement action against
him. Although the standard of proof in damage actions parallels the standard in injunctive
actions, the practical effect of Shore may be that defendants will seek to argue that the effect
of collateral estoppel in a subsequent action for damages coupled with the collateral effects
of an injunction now requires a showing of proof in the injunctive action at least as great as
that employed in Collins.
24. In corrupt practices cases involving alleged payments to foreign officials, the use of
the jurisdictional means in furtherance of the improper conduct may not be found and proved
as easily as it is in other securities cases where the use of the mails or other instrumentalities
of interstate commerce is commonplace and easily proven.
25. So-called "grease" payments to insure cooperation of customs officials and the like
are omitted from the coverage of the FCPA by excluding from the definition of a foreign
official "any employee of a foreign government ... or instrumentality. . . whose duties are
essentially ministerial or clerical." Exchange Act § 30A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b) (Supp. I
1977).
26. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND UaAN A"wS, CORRuPr OVERSEAS PAYMENTS BY U.S. BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976).
27. Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 14478, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
72,264 (Feb. 16, 1978) (citing H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 10 (1977)).

11
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defendant, even if the language of the statute allegedly violated
arguably may require some form of intentional conduct as an element of the violation."
There is an obvious parallel to the debate over whether scienter,
that is, conduct involving "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud,"2 is a necessary element in an action
for injunctive relief under the anti-fraud provisions of section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5.30 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit focused
on the Commission's policy argument to support injunctive relief
and rejected it in the first appellate decision that squarely decided
the scienter question in an SEC injunctive action." The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, accepted the policy argument, and cited the language of the legislative history of section
21(d) at the time of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975:
"'[S]cienter, causation and the extent of damages are elements
not required to be demonstrated in a Commission injunctive action.' "32 The court stated: "It would be difficult to find a clearer
indication . . . that Congress intended to exempt SEC injunction
actions from the scienter requirement applicable to private actions."u
Even if the courts ultimately insist on a standard of intentional
conduct in injunctive actions under section 30A, recklessness on the
part of the defendants may meet that standard. Indeed, recklessness
has been held sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement in enforcement actions brought under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5." A
28. See HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN CoaMNMRMv,
UM.AWFUL CORPORATE PAYmENTs ACT OF 1977, H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977).

29. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976). Since the Supreme
Court's decision in Hochfelder, some lower courts have held that knowing participation in
unlawful conduct in the sense that one intended to act as opposed to negligent action was
sufficient to satisfy a scienter requirement. See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057
(D. Del. 1976). Other courts have held that the conduct must not only be knowing in that
sense but also must include an intent to harm the defendant. See, e.g., SEC v. Am. Realty
Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148, 1171 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th
Cir. 1978).
30. This question was, of course, left open by the Hochfelder opinion. 425 U.S. at 194
n.12.
31. SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978).
32. SEC v. Aaron, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,800, at 95,131 (2d Cir. 1979);
cf. SEC v. Am. Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978) (accepting the Commission's
policy approach with regard to an injunction against future violations of section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 76q(a) (1976).
33. SEC v. Aaron, [Current] FEn. SEC. L. REP. at 95,131.
34. See generally SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, U.S.
-,
47 U.S.L.W. 3586, reh. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3699 (U.S. 1979); cf. Rolf v. Blythe, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, cert. denied, U.S. _,
99 S. Ct. 642 (1979) (recklessness will suffice to establish scienter in an action for damages).
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recklessness versus negligence analysis is most likely to develop
under section 30A(a)(3) which deals with payments or promises to
"any person, while knowing or having reason to know that all or a
portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or
promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign
political office" for prohibited purposes. (Emphasis added).
The "reason to know" standard suggests that the issuer cannot
ignore "red flags," that is, indications that would lead the reasonable person to believe something may be amiss. After being put on
notice, will the failure to investigate constitute negligence or
recklessness? The failure to investigate in the presence of danger
signs should suffice to establish recklessness, and, concomitantly,
liability under section 30A(a)(3), assuming all other elements of a
violation are present.ss
Even absent red flags, in light of the obligations imposed by the
FCPA, the failure to investigate material matters may suffice to
establish a "reckless" standard based on "conscious avoidance."
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Hanlon,
stated: "One may not deliberately close his eyes to what otherwise
would have been obvious to him. '"36 Just as the failure to investigate
in the presence of red flags may result in liability, so too, the failure
to investigate for red flags may result in liability. Thus, the prudent
approach would be to conduct some investigation even though there
are no danger signs.
This message should not be misread. It is offered not to enlist
volunteers in an SEC crusade, but rather to highlight the opportunity to establish good faith, a key issue in an injunctive action. Lack
of good faith compliance may not only give rise to violations but also
bears importantly on the availability of injunctive relief.37 In addition, the development of a stronger competitive position may result
from this prudence. The benefits to be gained are analogous to the
35. Red flags in corrupt practices cases will, of course, vary from case to case. A red flag
might be merely doing business in certain countries where bribes are a way of life, having to
switch agents to close a deal, or having to pay a commission that is excessive. See Hehmeyer,
Government Complicity in Payments?, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1978, at 26, col. 4. The author,
in this letter to Philip Heymann of the Department of Justice, states that he was present at
a meeting during which officials of the government of the United States advised businessmen
that "under-the-table payments" to government officials in the Middle East were customary.
36. 548 F.2d 1096, 1100 n.7 (2d Cir. 1978). Hanlon did not involve charges under the
federal securities laws. The principal charges were wire fraud and false statements to obtain
loans from a federally insured bank.
37. See text accompanying notes 16 and 17 supra.
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benefits that result from a trading suspension, 3' which over the short
term may cause discomfort to a company whose securities have been
suspended. Over the long term, the company and certainly the marketplace will be stronger as a result of the suspension. Further,
investigation in the ordinary course of business may uncover information that will cause a company to turn away business. Although
causing some short-term discomfort, over the long term the company will develop strength because it will compete based upon the
quality of its product and because it will develop a reputation for
integrity.
Obtaining, Retaining or Directing Business
To fall within the proscription of section 30A, a payment or a
promise to pay must be made to assist in obtaining, retaining or
directing business to any person. In focusing on these proscriptions,
the 95th Congress adopted what may seem to be a narrower standard than that considered by the 94th Congress which would have
also covered payments to influence legislation or regulations.3 ' However, under many circumstances, payments to obtain favorable
regulatory rulings or legislation may well be covered by the FCPA.
This may occur in a number of ways. First, in many cases relief from
regulations may result in assisting a company to obtain or retain
business. Consider, for example, attempts at relief from export taxes
by an exporter of raw materials. Obtaining lower export taxes from
a foreign country in order to reduce the cost of raw materials may
enable it to undersell competitors. Thus, payments to obtain relief
from export taxes may assist in retaining business. Likewise, payments to obtain lower import taxes on sales in a foreign country may
be designed to improve the importer's competitive position and thus
assist it in obtaining or retaining business in that country. Although
all may not agree with these interpretations, it is clear that Congress, by using the words "to assist" in referring to obtaining, retaining or directing business, intended a broad reach for those provisions of the Act.4
Second, a payment to obtain favorable action on a statute or a
regulation that confers substantive benefits on one company, that
is, something equivalent to a private statute, will most likely also
be covered by section 30A. For example, in January 1976, the Com38. See Exchange Act § 12k, 15 U.S.C. § 78(1)(k) (1976).
39. Atkinson, supra note 1, at 27 n.50.
40. Exchange Act § 30A(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (Supp. I 1977).
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mission alleged that United Brands had paid $2.5 million to high
government officials of the Republic of Honduras to obtain relief
from export taxes on bananas.4 ' The complaint alleged that the
export taxes would have a material adverse effect on the operations
of United Brands. There should be no question that payments such
as those allegedly made by United Brands to obtain relief from
legislation that would adversely affect its business are payments to
obtain or retain business. Proof that the payment was to alleviate
an adverse effect on the company's operations, provided that effect
is material, should suffice to establish the violation.
Finally, there is still the question of disclosure as illustrated by
the United Brands case. Some may consider it too great a stretch
to suppose that the FCPA covers payments to obtain relief from
export or import duties or similar regulations or legislation. Nevertheless, where such payments are material, the disclosure provisions
of the federal securities laws will apply.
Materiality in the disclosure context, of course, is not limited
to a material effect on the company's earnings. In its report to
Congress on questionable payments, the Commission noted that
materiality in the disclosure context may be demonstrated by,
among other things, the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

the falsification of corporate books and records;
the recipients of the payments;
the knowledge or participation of corporate management;
the effect on the corporation's business (including the effect
of cessation on earnings or the potential for expropriation);
and
(5) the legality of the payment under local law, and the amount
of the payment."

INJuNCTIVE ACTIONS TO ENFORCE THE RECORDKEEPING
PROVISIONS OF THE FCPA AND RELATED RULES
Materiality
The concept of materiality is likely to be a focal issue in most
injunctive actions alleging noncompliance with section 13(b)(2)(A)
and rule 13b2-1. Neither the section nor the rule contains the word
"material." The American Bar Association Guide to section
13(b)(2) (Guide)' 3 discusses the section in terms of "errors" (inaccu41. SEC Litigation Release No. 7251, SEC Docket 1141 (1976).

42. See generally SEC REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE
(1976) [hereinafter cited as SEC REPORT

AND PRAcricEs

AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS
ON QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS].

43. Comm on Corporate Law and Accounting of the ABA, A Guide to the New Section
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racies resulting from unintentional conduct) and "irregularities"
(inaccuracies resulting from intentional conduct). The Guide suggests that a person who intentionally falsifies records places "himself in jeopardy under the penalty provisions of section 32(a) of the
1934 Act . . . [and] [t]he accounting concept of materiality is not
relevant to such a violation."" Section 32(a) concerns criminal
penalties. Presumably, in a remedial injunctive action involving
intentional falsification of records, the authors of the Guide would
concede that the "accounting concept of materiality" is again not
relevant to a finding of a violation.
Where the inaccuracies result from "errors" (unintentional conduct), the Guide suggests a violation of section 13(b)(2)(A) may
have occurred "if an issuer's books and records contain errors of a
magnitude that renders them material according to traditional
standards of accounting, and the mistaken entries are used as a
basis for the preparation of financial statements. . .. "1 Next the
Guide suggests that, even if an error material in the traditional
accounting sense has been made, where it is corrected before it
appears in the issuer's financial statements a "successful defense"
should be available to a section 13(b)(2)(A) charge. 6 Furthermore,
the Guide argues that where there is no intentional conduct, immaterial inaccuracies should not constitute a violation of section
13(b)(2)(A).
No one should argue with a suggestion that the Commission,
before instituting an injunctive action, ought to consider efforts to
correct errors. But there is no basis for engrafting to section
13(b)(2)(A) the concept of materiality "according to traditional
standards of accounting." The Congress was confronted with widespread breakdowns in corporate accounting systems, and some of
the most egregious problems involved off-the-books slush funds that
were not material in the traditional accounting sense because the
slush funds were dwarfed by the assets and earnings of the corporations. The Congress also had before it the record of enforcement
actions brought by the Commission. 8 In these actions, the complaints alleged that the defendants failed to disclose inaccurate
13(b)(2) Accounting Requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Section 102 of
the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct of 1977), 34 Bus. Law. 307 (1978).
44. Id. at 315.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See generally SEC REPORT ON QUETIONARBI PAYers, supra note 42.
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books and records. Not one complaint alleged that the inaccuracies
were material in the traditional accounting sense. Moreover, many
corporate defendants consented to the entry of an injunction containing a paragraph in the decree enjoining them from making false
entries on their books and records "material in nature, amount or
effect, "' language specifically designed to go beyond the notion of
materiality in the traditional accounting sense.
Commentators on rule 13b2-1 during the proposal period urged
the Commission to limit the application of the rule to material
falsifications of corporate books and records." The Commission declined to so limit the rule noting that the concept of " 'material'
falsifications of corporate books and records."' The Commission declined to so limit the rule noting that the concept of "'material'
in its release announcing the adoption of rule 13b2-1 suggested that
the presence of the words " 'in reasonable detail' in section
13(b)(2)(A) should alleviate much of the concern expressed in comments concerning" the proposed rule. 5 As noted in the Commission's release, those words were inserted in section 13(b)(2)(A) by
the Conference committee to alleviate concerns that the section
would require a degree of perfection unattainable in practice.0 But
the committee went on to explain that the "reasonable detail"
amendment was intended to make "clear that the issuer's records
should reflect transactions in conformity with accepted methods of
recording economic events and effectively prevent off-the-books
slush funds and payments of bribes."" The committee's explanation
highlighting its goal of limiting off-the-books slush funds and
bribes, coupled with the knowledge that the Congress had considered many slush fund and bribe cases not limited by the concept of materiality "according to traditional standards of accounting" weighs against the approach by the Guide. But the most compelling argument against the inclusion of the materiality concept in
the books and records provisions is that Congress did not see fit tW
use the term "material" in section 13(b)(2), and, manifestly, when
49. See, e.g., SEC v. Exxon Corp., [19771 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-20 (D.D.C.
1977); SEC v. Lockheed Airways Corp., [1977) SEc. REG. & L. Rep. (BNA) A-3 (D.D.C.
1976).
50. 16 SEC Docket, supra note 10, at 1150, [Current] FED. SEc. L. RE. at 81,397.
51. Id. at 1151, [Current] FED. Szc. L. REP. at 81,397-98.
52. Id.

53. Id.
54. HousE CONFERENCE COMM., FOREIGN CoRauir PRAcncEs, H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CoDe CONG. & AD. NEws 4121, 4122.
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Congress intended to use the term in the securities5 laws, it did so,
including the use of the term twice in section 13.1
Scienter
The Guide rejects the possibility that a repeated pattern of
errors might be a violation of section 13(b)(2)(A) because "no element of intent would be present." Legislative history presents a
compelling argument that the Guide is incorrect. The books and
records provisions considered by the Senate included provisions
that paralleled the Commission's present rules 13b2-1 and 13b2-2
concerning falsification of books and records and false statements
to accountants. These provisions as considered by the Senate included the term "knowingly." However, as a result of the presence
of a scienter requirement, those provisions were dropped from the
Senate bill. 56 Thus, a scienter requirement was considered in the
context of section 13(b) and, by design, was not included in the
statute as passed. Again the Commission in announcing the adoption of rules 13b2-1 and 13b2-2 indicated it had considered and
rejected the suggestions of commentators to include the scienter
requirement in the rules as adopted. The Commission urged that
the inclusion of a scienter requirement in the rules would be inconsistent with the language in section 13(b)(2)(A).1
There may be more room for argument on the necessity of scienter as an element in injunctive actions alleging violations of rule
13b2-1. Under the rule, "no person shall, directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to be falsified" books and records subject to section
13(b)(2)(A). In dissenting from the adoption of the rule, Commissioner Karmel noted that the term "falsify" implies an element of
deceit." Although not cited by the Commissioner, there is an obvious parallel to the Supreme Court's observation in Ernst & Ernst
v.Hochfelder that "[tihe words 'manipulative or deceptive' used
in conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly suggest that
§10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional miscon55. Exchange Act §§ 13(b)(2), 13(g)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(2), 78m(g)(2) (1976 &
Supp. 1 1977).
56. HOUSE CONFERENCE COMM., supra note 54, at 10-11, [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4122-24. The Conference committee dropped a companion provision to section
13(b)(2)(A) that would have prohibited the falsification of books and records because it
decided "that this legislation should not be converted into a debate on the important issues
raised by the Hochfelder decision." Id. at 11, [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 4123.
57. 16 SEC Docket, supra note 10, at 1151, [Current] FED. SEc. L. RE,. at 81,398.
58. Id. at 1155, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. at 81,401.
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duct." 5' But in Hochfelder, the Supreme Court did not have the
benefit of the explicit intent of Congress on the meaning of the terms
used in section 10(b).1 In contrast, the Commission has expressed
its intent not to include a scienter requirement in rule 13b2-1, and
the Commission notes that its view is not inconsistent with section
13(b)(2)(A).61
Corrections as Admissions
The Guide cautions against a possible unwelcome consequence
of the passage of section 13(b)(2)(A):
No interpretation of the new accounting provisions of section
13(b) (2) could be more shortsighted or self-defeating than one that
would lead companies to be afraid to correct discovered errors for
fear that the correction itself would constitute an admission of
violation of the statute and would later be used against the com"
pany as a basis for imposing liability upon it.
This observation is seriously misleading. A company has no
choice but to correct errors; to do otherwise would be to fail to
comply with the mandate in section 13(b)(2) to make and keep
accurate books and records. But more to the point, the tacit assumption behind the concern is that the statute will be administered by automatons. No prosecutor could state that every correction will result in absolute protection from prosecution. The circumstances of a case may dictate the necessity for an action even when
corrections have been made, and this is especially true with respect
to civil injunctive actions. Nevertheless, anyone with responsibility
for recommending enforcement action must consider ameliorative
steps taken by the subject of an investigation, and those steps may
properly be the basis for recommending against enforcement action.
The solution to the dilemma perceived by the Guide lies not in
engrafting to the statute interpretive exemptions that frustrate congressional intent and eliminate protections for the public. Rather,
59. 425 U.S. at 197.
60. Id. at 196.
61. Although not articulated in the Commission's release, this latter statement anticipates an argument based on the holding of the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In Santa Fe the Court held that if rule 10b-5 were interpreted to
cover conduct not involving manipulation or deception, the coverage of the rule would exceed
the breadth of section 10(b). The wording of section 13(b)(2)(A) would seem to preclude a
similar argument in this context. But if one can somehow find a scienter requirement in
section 13(b)(2)(A), it follows that it should also be found in rule 13b2-1.
62. Comm. on Corporate Law and Accounting of the ABA, supra note 43, at 316.
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the solution lies in utilizing the protections provided by the Commission's procedures for participants in an investigation. On the
part of a proposed defendant or respondent, this means vigorously
bringing ameliorative factors to the attention of the Commission's
staff during the investigation, and, if advocacy at the staff level
fails, submitting argument to the Commission in what is commonly
called a "Wells submission. 6 3 The Commission carefully reviews all
recommendations for enforcement, and it is safe to say that one of
the more significant factors that may weigh in favor of a proposed
defendant or respondent is that the problem was corrected and
brought forward by that person.
INJUNcTIVE ACTIONS BROUGHT BY THE COMMISSION
CHARGING VIOLATIONS 'OFTHE

FCPA

The Commission has brought three injunctive actions to enforce the FCPA. In SEC v. Aminex Resources Corp." the Commission alleged that Aminex, certain officers, and certain controlled
corporations had misappropriated $1.24 million of the corporate assets of Aminex. An Aminex officer allegedly created a corporation
and caused Aminex to pay that corporation for engineering services
that were never performed. The complaint also charged that the
same officer sold a boat owned by Aminex and diverted to himself
the profits of the sale. hi addition, officers of Aminex allegedly
caused Aminex to pay them $110,000 in one instance and $30,000
in another instance without proper corporate authorizations and
allegedly caused the corporation to falsely record the unauthorized
payments as administrative fees. All the alleged misconduct took
place within the United States. The Commission charged that the
facts alleged in the complaint constituted a failure to comply with
the books and records requirements of section 13(b)(2)(A) and a
failure to comply with the internal control requirements of section
13(b)(2)(B). Aminex was the first case brought by the Commission
under the FCPA, and it illustrates that the Commission will allege
violations of section 13(b)(2), although there is no foreign involvement of any kind.
63. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) (1978).
96,352 (D.D.C. 1978). All the
64. 11978 Transfer Binder] FaD. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH)
defendants, with the exception of Aminex Resources and its subsidiaries, consented to the
entry of injunctions without admitting or denying the Commission's allegations. SEC v.
Aninex Resources Corp., 11978 Transfer Binder) FaD. Sac. L. RFP. (CCH) 96,458 (D.D.C.
1978).
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In SEC v. Page Airways 5 the Commission alleged that a Page
subsidiary contracted to operate and service aircraft that had been
sold to a foreign country. The subsidiary allegedly, from at least
December 19, 1977, to the date of the filing of the complaint (April
12, 1978), failed to record on its books, receipts and disbursements
of the cash received for its services. The complaint also alleged that
certain transactions were effected without adequate documentation
and accounting controls sufficient to ensure that expenditures made
by the Page subsidiary were made for the purpose indicated on the
company's books and records. The complaint alleged that the conduct of Page constituted a continuing failure to make and keep
records in accordance with section 13(b)(2)(A) and a failure to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls as required by section 13(b)(2).
In SEC v. Katy Industries, Inc., 6 the Commission alleged that
Katy's agreement to pay to a consulting corporation controlled by
Katy's agent and a representative of an Indonesian government
13.33 percent of Katy's profits from oil production in Indonesia
resulted in a violation of section 30A. The Commission alleged that
in 1974, 1975, and 1976, approximately $200,000 was paid to the
consulting corporation by Katy for the benefit of the government
official. Although no payments were made after May 1976, the
agreement allegedly continued until at least July 28, 1978, when
Katy terminated it by letter. The Commission alleged that the
agreement constituted a promise to pay in violation of section 30A.
The allegations illustrate that the Commission may take the view
that acts which occurred prior to the passage of the FCPA may have
a continuing effect after the passage of the Act. The Katy allegations do not involve a retroactive application of the FCPA.6 7
In a similar vein, the provisions of section 13(b)(2) requiring an
issuer to "make and keep" accurate records may raise the question
of the obligation of an issuer to correct inaccuracies in the books and
records that were recorded prior to the FCPA. Presumably the obligation to keep accurate books and records will require an issuer to
make such corrections. However, this need not entail correcting
65. [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
96,393 (D.D.C. 1978). Subsequently, this case was transferred to the Western District of New York. [1978 Transfer
Binderj FaD. Sec. L. RzP. (CCH) 96,717 (D.D.C. 1978).
66. 15 SEC Docket 891 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
67. The Supreme Court has held that a civil statute will not be applied retroactively
unless there is a clear mandate from the legislature to do so. Greene v. United States, 376
U.S. 149, 160 (1964). There would appear to be no such mandate in the FCPA.
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every journal entry or record that was incorrect. If the conduct
which led to the inaccurate entries has been terminated and described in a disclosure document together with disclosure of the fact
that the books and records in question were inaccurate, that should
suffice to satisfy the provision of the statute requiring the issuer to
make and keep accurate books and records."
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION
OF THE EXCHANGE

15(c)(4)

ACT

In addition to injunctive actions, administrative proceedings
under section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act should figure prominently in the enforcement of the FCPA. Section 15(c)(4) was not
amended by the passage of the FCPA, but that section provides the
Commission with the authority, after notice and opportunity for
hearing, to order any person subject to the provisions of sections 12,
13 or subsection (d) of section 15, or any rule or regulation thereunder to comply with any such provision, rule or regulation upon
such terms and conditions and within such time as the Commission
may specify in an order. Since the books and records and controls
provisions of the FCPA were made part of section 13 in the Exchange Act, section 15(c)(4) would seem to give the Commission the
power to require compliance with section 13(b) and the rules thereunder on such-terms and conditions as the Commission may order.
A recent section 15(c)(4) proceeding illustrates the Commission's approach to imposing terms and conditions that may become
more common with the advent of the FCPA. In re Hycel, Inc.,"5
involved an allegation that Hycel, in filings with the Commission,
failed to disclose that the chairman of the board had used corporate
funds for his personal benefit. The corporation, without admitting
or denying the allegations, consented to findings of violations solely
for the purposes of the section 15(c)(4) proceeding. The Commission
found that Hycel had failed to maintain an adequate internal control system and that the board of directors bore part of the responsibility for the company's lack of internal controls. The Commission
ordered Hycel to comply with its undertaking to ensure that its
audit committee would be made up of independent directors and
would review compliance procedures designed to prevent the misuse
of corporate funds. The Commission also ordered the company to
68. There may be an obligation to disclose that books and records were false wholly apart
from the obligations created by section 13(b)(2). See text accompanying note 41 supra.
69. [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,676 (1978).
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comply with its undertaking to require the audit committee to report to the Commission any deviation from the procedures adopted
as part of the settlement to prevent future violations. It is not a big
step to go from ordering compliance with terms and conditions in
undertakings to ordering directly the same terms and conditions.
Individual Liability in section 15(c)(4) Proceedings
A Commission official has said that the Commission's ability
to order a sanction 0in a section 15(c)(4) proceeding may be
"virtually boundless." Does the absence of bounds extend to naming individuals as respondents in section 15(c)(4) proceedings? To
date, the Commission has not included the name of any individual
in the caption of a section 15(c)(4) proceeding. However, in the
Hycel case, and in a section 15(c)(4) proceeding involving the filings
of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,7 1 individuals who had been associated with an issuer were discussed by name in the proceedings and
the conduct of the individuals which related to the alleged nondisclosures was dealt with by the Commission's acceptance of an undertaking from the individuals, which was referred to in the body
of the section 15(c)(4) order.
In a recent administrative proceeding brought pursuant to sections 15(c)(4) and 21(a) of the Exchange Act, the Commission
named an individual as well as an issuer in the caption. 71 In a dissenting opinion, Commissioner Karmel questioned the Commission's authority to bring an administrative proceeding against an
individual under section 15(c)(4), noting that the language of the
section and its legislative history indicates that the Commission
requested the enactment of the section in order to provide it with
73
authority to correct filings under sections 12, 13 and 15(d). Commissioner Karmel is also of the view that the authority granted to
the Commission in section 21(a) does not empower the Commission
to bring an administrative action against an individual." In In re
GEICO,75 there is also a reference to individuals in the context of a
proceeding brought pursuant to section 15(c)(4) and section 21(a).
But all of the administrative actions referring to individuals under
70.
Journal
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Accounting Provisions of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Discussed at New York Law
Seminar, [1978J SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) D-1, D-2 (May 3, 1978).
In re Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 7 SEC Docket 866 (1975).
In re Spartek, Inc., and John A. Cable, 16 SEC Docket 1094 (1979).
Id. at 1102.
Id.
10 SEC Docket 790 (1976).
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section 15(c)(4) or in a combined proceeding under 15(c)(4) and
section 21(a) have been resolved on the basis of consents on the part
of the parties involved. Thus, there has been no litigated precedent
for the inclusion of an individual in administrative proceedings
under section 15(c)(4).
VIcARIous LIABILITY UNDER THE

FCPA

The liability of issuers for the acts or failures of foreign or domestic subsidiaries is not clearly specified in section 30A and section
13(b). Section 30A covers the conduct of registered and reporting
companies and the conduct of any officer, director, employee, or
agent of any such company or any stockholder of such company
acting on behalf of the company. Thus, by its terms, section 30A
does not refer to subsidiaries whose securities are not registered or
which are not required to file reports pursuant to section 15(d). The
legislative history of section 30A indicates that the section was not
intended to cover the activities of foreign subsidiaries where there
was no jurisdictional nexus with the United States and where the
issuer of a reporting company had no knowledge of the payment."
In discussing the liability of domestic concerns the Conference
committee report stated:
[Tihe conferees recognized the inherent jurisdictional, enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties raised by the inclusion of foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. companies in the direct prohibitions of the bill.
However, the conferees intend to make clear that any issuer or
domestic concern which engages in bribery of foreign officials indirectly through any other person or entity would itself be liable
7
under the bill.
to the activities
Thus, Congress intended section 30A(a)(3) to apply
8
of foreign subsidiaries in certain circumstances.1
76. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, FOREIGN CoRRuPT PRACTICES
ACT OF 1977, S. Rep. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 11, reprintedin 119771 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4098, 4109.
77. HousE CONFERENCE COMM., supra note 54, at 14, [19771 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 4126.
78. The Conference committee also stated that
jurisdictional, enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties may not be present in
the case of individuals who are U.S. citizens, nationals, or residents. Therefore,
individuals other than those specifically covered by the bill (e.g., officers, directors,
employees, agents, or stockholders acting on behalf of an issuer or domestic concern) will be liable when they act in relation to the affairs of any foreign subsidiary
of an issuer or domestic concern if they are citizens, nationals, or residents of the
United States. In addition, the conferees determined that foreign nationals or resi-
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In this connection, section 20(a) of the Exchange Act will no
doubt be brought to bear in FCPA enforcement matters. Section
20(a) governs the conduct of controlling persons. 9 It has been
argued that since the section states that controlling persons will be
liable to any person to whom controlled persons are liable, its application should be limited to damage actions. Nonetheless, section
20(a) has been applied in SEC enforcement actions.'*
Aiding and Abetting
Section 20(a) provides a defense for a controlling person who
acted "in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act
or acts constituting the violation or cause of action." This good faith
defense has led to Commission reliance in enforcement actions on
the concept of aiding and abetting, since, in theory, one may be
negligent yet act in good faith, and it may be argued that one may
aid and abet through negligence. In addition, aiding and abetting
has often been used to ascribe liability to second level participants
(other than control persons) such as lawyers, accountants or others
who render material assistance to the primary violator in connection
with the violation. Whether one can aid and abet violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the context of a civil action was
questioned in the Hochfelder case and specifically left open by the
Supreme Court.8 1 Since Hochfelder, courts in SEC enforcement actions have continued to find liability based on aiding and abetting.
But whether the appropriate standard governing liability should be
based upon aiding and abetting through negligence or aiding and
abetting with knowledge remains much in question. In SEC v.
Covens the Second Circuit in the context of a violation of section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 held that since a primary violator
dents otherwise under the jurisdiction of the United States would be covered by the
bill in circumstances where an issuer or domestic concern engaged in conduct
proscribed by the bill.

Id.
79. For a definition of "control," see 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(b) (1978).
80. See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. First
Sec. Co. of Chicago, 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972). Contra SEC
v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1974).
81. 425 U.S. at 191. For an excellent discussion on aiding and abetting, see Ruder,
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In
Pa Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972).
U.S. -,
47 U.S.L.W. 3586, reh.
82. 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3699 (U.S. 1979).
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may violate section 17(a) by virtue of negligence, there was no reason why knowledge or scienter should be a necessary element of
aiding and abetting such a violation., The Second Circuit stated
that the standard to be applied in determining whether one aids and
abets is "whether an alleged aider and abettor 'should have been
able to conclude that his act was likely to be used in furtherance of
illegal activity,' in light of all the circumstances." 4 The circumstances to be considered in determining whether a defendant should
have been able to conclude he was furthering illegal activity were
the nature of the defendant's assistance, his awareness of the illegal
scheme, his participation, and his duty to investigate."
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has applied a more stringent definition of aiding and abetting. In SEC v. Coffey8" the court held that
one may aid and abet if he has a "general awareness that his role
was part of an overall activity that is improper, and [that he]
87
knowingly and substantially assisted the violation.
Liability for a Subsidiary's InaccurateBooks
and Records or Inadequate Controls
The Guide suggests that section 13(b) will apply to a subsidiary
or an investee of an issuer only if that entity's financial statements
are material to the issuer's financial statements." The Senate committee comments on Senate Bill 305 do not place the same limitations on section 13(b) stating, "under the accounting section no offthe-books accounting fund could be lawfully maintained, either by
a U.S. parent or by a foreign subsidiary .
,81 Congress clearly
"...
did not intend to limit an issuer's responsibility to matters reflected
in its financial statements. The conduct the Congress intended to
outlaw through the FCPA frequently involved subsidiaries whose
books and records were falsified to create the slush funds that were
used to make questionable or illegal payments. It is unreasonable
to suppose that Congress intended that issuers could continue such
activities and escape liability by funneling the corrupt practices
through a subsidiary. Certainly it is appropriate in determining an
83. Id. at 1028.
84. Id. (citation omitted).
85. Id.
86. 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1974).
87. Id. at 1316 (emphasis added).
88. Comm. on Corporate Law and Accounting of the ABA, supra note 43, at 310.
89. S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 4098, 4109.
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issuer's liability for inaccuracies in the books and records of a subsidiary or for insufficient controls in a subsidiary to look to the
provisions of the rules relating to control under the Exchange Act
or to relevant accounting principles. For example, rule 1-02(g) under
regulation S-X defines control as "possession, direct or indirect, of
the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and
policies of a person, whether through the ownership or voting shares,
by contract, or otherwise," 0 and the accounting profession recognizes that a company should account for a subsidiary on an equity
basis if it has less than 50 percent ownership and exercises a significant influence over the subsidiary." Whether an issuer is in a position to direct the policies of or exert a significant influence on a
subsidiary or an investee will, of course, be a factual matter. It will
be possession of the power to direct policies or to exercise a significant influence-not the exercise of that power or the exercise of that
influence-that will trigger liability for the acts of subsidiaries or
investees under section 13(b).
CONCLUSION

As a nation we understand the implications of corrupt practices. Improper or questionable payments undermine our foreign
policy and, in fact, place control of foreign policy in the hands of
private individuals or companies who do not respond to the electorate. Corrupt practices can topple friendly governments, increase
hostility to the United States, and provide ammunition to those who
would topple our own system. Shoddy accounting practices foster
those problems and result in significant detriment to individual
investors, and to the marketplace in general, by undermining inves90. 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(g) (1978). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(f) (1978).
91. FASB FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, OPINIONs OF THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
BOARD, No. 18 (1971) (original Pronouncements as of July 1, 1977). If a company were to
account for an investment in another company in consolidated financial statem-ents or by the
equity method, an inference of control may be drawn from those accounting choices. For
example, the Accounting Principles Board, discussing accounting for an investment by the
equity method, has concluded that
an investment. . . of 20% or more of the voting stock of an investee should lead to
a presumption that in the absence of evidence to the contrary an investor has the
ability to exercise significant influence over an investee. Conversely, an investment
of less than 20% of the voting stock of an investee should lead to a presumption
that an investor does not have the ability to exercise significant influence unless
such ability can be demonstrated.
Id. at 277. Having chosen to consolidate or account for an investment by the equity method,
a company should have concluded it has the ability to exercise significant influence over an
investee.
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tor confidence. The problems leading to the passage of the FCPA
have been more than sufficiently illumined in legislative history and
in enforcement actions brought by government agencies. Against
this background, it is unlikely that the courts will interpret the
FCPA narrowly.

